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Abstract: 
China has stepped up its efforts on abating pollution, saving energy and reducing emissions. Local 
government involvement is crucial. In the 12th Five-Year Plan period (2011–2015), Shanghai 
municipality’s two main mitigation policies were the carbon-market pilot (emissions-trading scheme, 
ETS) and the 10,000 Enterprises Energy-Saving and Low-Carbon Actions (10,000 Programme). The ETS 
pilot achieved full compliance, whereas 15–17% of the 10,000 Programme’s target entities fell short 
each year. This article compares how the government implemented the policies, seeking factors that 
can explain the outputs. The structured and focused comparison employs a policy-implementation 
process model, using data from written sources and semi-structured interviews in Shanghai and 
Beijing, 2015–2017. The government’s normative power emerged as a major factor: the local 
ownership of the ETS pilot sent strong normative signals to target entities that it was important to 
complete the tasks required of them. Further, policy requirements for determining output were 
more detailed and less flexible in the 10,000 Programme than the ETS pilot, making full compliance 
difficult. 
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1. Introduction 
During China’s 12th Five-Year Plan period (2011–2015), attention to air pollution grew, as illustrated 
by State Council’s 2013 Action Plan on Air Pollution (Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2013). 
Climate change had been declared a national priority in 2007, and energy-saving policies were 
important in the 11th Five-Year period (2006–2010) (Li & Wang, 2012). Fossil fuels are sources of both 
ambient pollutants such as PM, NOX and SO2 and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Gu e al., 2018). 
Although not all measures to improve air quality will also mean a reduction in GHG emissions, GHG 
curbing measures such as improving energy efficiency and fuel substitutions bring lower ambient 
pollutant emissions (Wang & Hao 2012). 
In line with the stricter national policies and targets for controlling emissions and curbing energy use, 
the 12th Five-Year Plan aimed for 17% reduction of carbon emissions/GDP (carbon intensity) and 16% 
reduction of energy use/GDP (energy intensity). Further, the Plan announced that a carbon emissions 
trading market would be established (12th Five-Year Plan, 2011). China’s national emissions-trading 
scheme (ETS) was the first policy-tool where carbon emissions were the ‘currency’. Seven 
jurisdictions, including Shanghai, were chosen as ETS pilot for testing local carbon-markets before the 
national market commenced in 2017.1 A major national energy-saving policy was 10,000 Programme 
(in full: ‘10,000 Enterprises Energy-Saving and Low-Carbon Actions’), mainly targeting industry.  
Shanghai, a megacity with more than 20 million residents, is China’s financial centre, but still has 
considerable industry, accounting for about 63% of carbon emissions (Pan et al., 2017). During the 
12th Plan period, Shanghai implemented various measures for saving energy, reducing emissions and 
improving air quality, like speeding up the replacement of old production equipment and replacing 
coal fired boilers. This article focuses on how the Shanghai government approached enforcement of 
the 10,000 Programme and the ETS pilot in the 12th Plan period.  
Both policies were important for supporting the local reduction targets of carbon and energy 
intensities of 19% and 18% between 2011 and 2015 (Shanghai government, 2011). However, they 
differed in policy output – the extent to which companies met the requirements from these policies. 
All companies participating in the ETS surrendered the stipulated amount of allowances by the 
deadline, achieving full compliance every year: Shanghai was the only of the seven pilots to achieve 
this. In the 10,000 Programme, however, some 15% to 17% of companies failed to fulfil the 
requirements – whereas the two neighbouring provinces Jiangsu and Zhejiang had over 1,100 
companies in the 10,000 Programme each, with only a 2–8 % annual failure rate. 
  
 
1 The other pilots were Beijing, Chongqing, Shenzhen and Tianjin municipalities, and the two provinces 
Guangdong and Hubei. 
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Table 1. Shanghai: Output of the 10,000 Programme and the ETS, 12th Five-Year Plan Period (2011–
2015) 
Policies’ output rates/ Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 
10,000 Programme: Number of target 
entities not achieving target / total 
numberᶧ 
42/269  43/253 38/248 
 
N/A* 
Output percentage (84.4%) (83.0%) (84.7%) 
ETS: Number of entities not complying / 
total number 
Policy not 
yet in 
effect 
0/191 0/191 0/191 
 
Output percentage (100%) (100%) (100%) 
ᶧ The number of companies covered fell, due to terminations and relocations. *2015 details not released by the 
central or Shanghai authorities. 
There was some overlap: some companies were covered by both policies; and some which managed 
to fulfil the ETS requirements did not fulfil their 10,000 Programme obligations. As the ETS pilot was 
a new policy mechanism and the 10,000 Programme policy requirements were more familiar to 
implementing agencies and target entities, results might have been expected to be the converse. To 
explain the output, this article focuses on what the government did to enforce requirements, and on 
government–company interactions. Employing a policy-implementation model to organize the 
comparison, it asks: What factors can help to explain the two outputs in Shanghai? 
The article contributes empirical data about low carbon policies implemented in China. The purpose 
here is not to test or refine models, but to take the model as a starting-point in exploring which 
factors may drive or impede implementation. 
2. Method and research design  
This study began in 2015 with interest of what local governments in China, cities in particular, were 
doing to curb GHG emissions. Relevant for choosing Shanghai as the city of study is that it is a 
forerunner in several areas, including economic development, energy statistics and peaked its coal 
consumption in 2011 (Pan et al., 2017). Shanghai’s developments may provide lessons for other parts 
of China (Yang et al,. 2018). Reviewing the annual lists of energy-saving and emissions-reduction 
tasks for 2014 and 2015, I found many tasks took the form of ‘promoting the integration of 
information technology and industrialization’ (Shanghai DRC, 2015a). Strengthening the direction of 
industrial development is important – but how to determine the degree of policy output? I chose the 
ETS pilot and the 10,000 Programme, as both are concrete in measures and output and therefore 
more suitable for comparison than policies which goals were to ‘strengthen’ or ‘improve’ without 
stipulated measurable outputs. The two policies differ – one focused on carbon-emissions 
allowances, the other on energy-saving –  but this is not a question of comparing ‘apples and 
oranges’, as both policies contribute to reducing emissions. As most of Shanghai’s energy comes 
from fossil fuels, energy saved means emissions saved. Both policies were put on the same list by the 
Shanghai government, signalling that the government sees them as means to the same end: to 
reduce emissions. 
4 
 
This study employs a combination of document analyses of written sources like official documents 
and news articles, and semi-structured interviews. Documents from the national and Shanghai 
governments, as well as the Shanghai implementing agencies, proved central for understanding the 
policy processes. Further, I followed specialist international news-channels like Carbon Pulse online, 
and the Chinese-language specialist magazines Shanghai Energy Conservation and Energy 
Conservation and Environmental Protection. Important additional information and assessments came 
from individuals directly involved with or who closely observed the two polices. I conducted 23 semi-
structured interviews with stakeholders in Shanghai and experts in Beijing, aiming to speak with at 
least one person from implementing agencies, target entities, third-party verifiers, government 
advisors, academics and consultants (see Appendix). I also benefitted from participation and informal 
communication with stakeholders at seminars and conferences on topics ranging from low-carbon 
development in China in general, to more Shanghai-specific matters. Fieldwork was conducted in 
March–November 2015, May–November 2016 and March 2017.  
The comparison is structured and focused. This method requires asking the same questions about 
the policies for structure, and is focused by dealing with selected aspects only (George & Bennett, 
2005). Armed with an in-depth understanding of both policies, I turned to the theory literature on 
policy-processes and implementation to formulate the analytical framework presented in section 4. 
3. Previous research 
Scholars have mapped Chinese efforts to improve air quality and mitigate GHG (Gu et al., 2018; 
Tambo et al., 2016), and cities’ efforts here (Liu et al., 2016; Pan et al., 2017). Several have 
documented the ‘implementation gap’ where local enforcement of national environmental policies 
deviates from national intentions (Kostka & Mol, 2013; Ran, 2013). Studies have focused on low-
carbon development (Cai et al., 2012) and specific projects like eco-cities (de Jong et al., 2016). This 
article offers a comparison of mitigation policies implemented within a single city. Studies of China’s 
ETS pilots have focused on allocation rules and other design elements, not implementation (Pang & 
Duan, 2016; Wu et al., 2014). The 10,000 Programme has emerged in a larger landscape of energy-
saving policies (Lo, 2014), and as a case for discussing authoritarian environmentalism (Lo, 2015). 
This article addresses the gap as regards comparative studies of enforcing these two key policies. 
Few implementation studies on environmental and energy-saving policies in China have ventured 
into modelling or theory-building applicable here. Recent decades of political studies in China have 
relied on the seminal 'Fragmented Authoritarianism’ model, which sees authority as highly 
fragmented, beyond the formal hierarchy of the bureaucracy and state (Lieberthal, 1992). Lieberthal 
(1997) saw the organization of the political system, with vertical and horizontal lines of authority, as 
a reason for the poor implementation of environmental policies. Seeking to amend the model with 
new knowledge, Mertha (2009) has argued that inclusion of actors outside the bureaucracy and the 
practice of establishing Leading Groups have opened possibilities for policy entrepreneurs in policy-
making. As helpful as these insights are, this literature covers a broad field of politics, not the 
implementation process per se. Searching for alternatives to explain the chosen policies, I found an 
implementation-process approach based on Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), further informed by 
others (Jänicke, 1997; Sabatier, 2005).  
4. The policy-implementation process model 
Van Meter and Van Horn’s (1975) model represents an influential addition to implementation 
studies, and later contributions have sought to rectify perceived shortcomings in its top–down 
approach (Sabatier, 2005). This article’s theoretical contribution is expanding the application of the 
theoretical framework. To the author’s knowledge it has not been employed on policy processes in 
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China before. Originally formulated for the US federal democratic context, with some adjustments it 
can also be applied here: The 1975 model emphasized inner workings of the implementing agencies: 
I have simplified some aspects. Furthermore, the model has a two-layer national–federal 
government structure. This I have shifted downwards, so that the levels are the municipal 
government and the targeted entities. This is a step towards a more bottom–up approach to policy-
processes, such as Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (2005), but is also necessary for 
explaining the policies. Ignoring interactions with, or the attitudes and reactions of the companies 
involved would obscure important explanatory factors. 
One may understand the policy process as dynamic, but with an anticipated order of how factors 
impact on each other and on policy implementation (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). The factors 
expected to influence the policy-output are: 
Policy 
Output assessment starts with the policy itself, two aspects in particular: 
1) Regulations and objectives: What were they? How difficult was it to fulfil them? The 
objective may be measurable, like number of coal-fired boilers switched to less-polluting 
fuels. The nature of the policy problem may indicate how simple or difficult it is to resolve 
(Jänicke, 1997). A local river may be easier to clean up than a border-crossing river. I expect 
output to be more readily achieved when there are fewer criteria to be met.  
2) Origin: Does the policy originate locally, or is it a top–down measure? Given China’s top–
down implementation gap (Kostka & Mol, 2013; Lo, 2014), I expect a policy which is initiated 
locally to be more likely to be achieved.  
Policy resources  
Funding and other resources allocated for the policy, including improving the expertise and numbers 
of implementing agency staff, are relevant. Available funding and incentives may make implementing 
agencies and target entities more positive towards the policy (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Here I 
relied mainly on documents from the implementing agencies themselves, combined with 
interviewees’ evaluations.  
Communication and enforcement activities 
Implementation depends on understandable policy objectives, so that those involved know what is 
expected of them. How policies are communicated by implementing agencies likely affects execution 
(Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Two types of enforcing activities are expected to be important: 1) 
assistance and technical advice to ensure that organizations executing the policy are qualified and 
informed; 2) rewards or punishments. The power of the enforcing agencies may be normative, 
remunerative or coercive. Normative power in the policies studied here would appear as the 
Shanghai government placing symbolic importance on a policy and ‘socialization, persuasion and 
cooptation’ (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). 
Economic, political and social conditions  
These conditions can influence all stages of implementation. Does the policy encounter support or 
opposition from interest groups or elites? If a policy will have sizeable impacts on social or economic 
conditions, that may affect implementation (Jänicke, 1997; Sabatier, 2005; Van Meter  & Van Horn, 
1975). I assessed this factor based on news and other documents, as well as interviews, public 
speeches and observations made at conferences and events, emphasizing the monetary pros and 
cons, expecting that to have particular effect on implementation. 
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Target entity responses and strategies 
Depending on the above-mentioned factors, the attitude of the entities covered by the policy may 
influence implementation. How they perceive the policy, and how strongly they feel about it, will 
probably influence implementation (Jänicke, 1997; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). If an entity 
disagrees deeply with a policy, it might try to stop or delay implementation. If attitudes are neutral, 
implementation may hinge on the perceived costs of implementation and potential conflicts with 
other priorities. Unable to consult all companies involved, I relied on interviews and news to get an 
understanding of company responses and strategies.  
Successful implementation is normally the result of a complex of factors, not one single factor 
(Jänicke, 1997). The above factors may be thought of linearly, but reality is probably less streamlined, 
with feedback loops where factors impacting on each other.  
5. The ETS pilot 
5.1 Policy  
The initiative for carrying out an ETS came from the Shanghai government itself (Stensdal et al., 
2018). After the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in November 2011 approved 
the Shanghai pilot, along with seven others (NDRC, 2011b) the Shanghai government started 
preparing its ETS. All the chosen local governments had asked NDRC to be selected as pilots. Being 
the primary implementing locations was seen as a means to obtain first mover advantages, such as 
being considered for hosting the national exchange. Furthermore, as local officials now are evaluated 
on both economic and ecological performances, the ETS seemed like a policy which caters to both 
concerns (Stensdal et al., 2018). There were examples outside China to study,2 but no carbon-market 
predecessor in China. Rules and regulations were created locally, not issued by the national 
government. 
In November 2013, the municipal government issued a decree setting the main layout and rules for 
the ETS pilot (Shanghai government, 2013). That this document was signed by the mayor sent 
normative signals: this policy was a priority-area. The other regulatory documents were issued by the 
Shanghai Development and Reform Commission (DRC).  
The general objective of emissions trading is to employ market mechanisms to control emissions, the 
rationale being that trading schemes stimulate forces that would not become active with other policy 
measures. An ETS makes emissions rights a commodity, thereby promoting economic activity (GDP) 
and possibly creating installation upgrading and technological innovations. 
Shanghai’s ETS covered industrial and non-industrial sectors. For industrial sectors, the threshold for 
participation was emissions above 20,000 tons of carbon annually 2009–2011, and 10,000 tons for 
non-industry sectors. With these criteria, 197 compliance entities were covered from the outset. 
Emissions 2009–2011 were registered and verified in 2012. From this information, the pilot 
government allocated emissions allowances for free to the compliance entities, each allowance 
giving the right to emit one ton of carbon. Allocation was done once at the beginning for 2013, 2014 
and 2015, with some 160 million allowances issued each year. Allowances not used in one year could 
be saved and used towards the following year’s requirement (‘banking’), but borrowing from future 
years’ allowances was prohibited. The rules stipulated punitive measures for various breaches of 
rules, ranging from 10,000 to 100,000 RMB. Other possible punitive measures included withdrawal of  
 
2 For more about this process in Shanghai, the other pilots and the national market, see Stensdal et al. (2018). 
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funding for energy-saving and emissions-reduction projects, as well as a maximum three-year 
restriction of eligibility for such funding (Shanghai government, 2013). 
Considerable time and resources went into knowledge-building and formulating the rules. There was 
a focus on communicating with potential compliance companies, from larger hearings to meetings 
with individual companies. Asked for their opinion, companies argued according to their specific 
situations. Those facing the prospect of having to buy allowances engaged more actively than those 
which did not. While most companies accepted the policy, ten companies from different sectors 
initially refused to be included, all arguing that the additional economic burden would be too great. 
They all eventually came around after informal talks and consultations with the pilot management. It 
was important for the pilot management to gain acceptance from the companies, as they were the 
ones that would eventually carry out the work.  
5.2 Implementation 
At the launch ceremony in August 2012, top officials from NDRC participated, adding prestige to the 
event (Shanghai DRC, 2015b). The Shanghai DRC was the main responsible agency for the ETS. The 
municipal government established a Leading Group, headed by then-deputy mayor Yang Xiong, who 
became mayor in 2013. A supporting Expert Committee consisting of local experts and scholars was 
also formed. The DRC was the Leading Group’s secretariat. As with NDRC nationally (Stensdal et al., 
2018), however, it lacked staff to manage the ETS pilot, and delegated tasks to other organizations: 
the Shanghai Information Office’s Centre for Low-carbon Economy and Addressing Climate Change, 
the Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange, and the Shanghai Energy Saving and Emission 
Reduction Centre (Shanghai DRC, 2015b). My interviewees agreed that the implementing agencies in 
Shanghai were highly competent, actively working to make the ETS a success. My own contact with 
the agencies confirmed this (interviews 1- 6, 8, 14, 16, 18-20, 22). That the mayor headed the 
Leading Group sent strong normative signals to the rest of the bureaucracy, the companies involved 
and society that this policy was important and should be supported.  
The implementing agencies provided assistance and technical advice. Training and meetings were 
held several times a year, some with vice-mayors present (Shanghai DRC, 2015b). Furthermore, to 
facilitate company inquiries, contact-points were established at the Information Office, the Exchange 
and the Energy-Saving and Emissions-Reduction Centre. The rules and objectives were available 
online, but interviewees noted that companies with no prior experience of market mechanisms 
needed time to comprehend and get used to the scheme. Larger companies with previous 
experience of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism or ETS outside China were 
generally quicker to embrace the system. Six companies shut down or moved out of Shanghai, so 
when the market opened there were 191 compliance companies. 
During the first compliance cycle, companies had to report their 2013 emissions by 31 March 2014. 
April was set aside for third-party verifiers to verify the reported emissions, and by the end of May 
the government declared the number of allowances each compliance company was to surrender. 
The total distributed 160 million allowances were estimated to cover all emissions, but power 
producers received fewer allowances than needed, as an incentive to spur greater efficiency. 
However, they were not able to reduce emissions, and had to buy allowances on the market. 
Problematically, there were too few allowances for sale in the market: those with a surplus had 
decided to ‘bank’ the allowances instead of selling them. In response, the government hosted 
informal talks urging the companies to start trading. The Exchange also arranged an event for 
matching sellers with buyers – but no matches were made, and the companies present complained 
about the allocation process. Trade picked up, but the government also announced it would hold a 
once-off auction on the deadline day, to give companies a chance to buy needed allowances. By the 
30 June deadline, only seven companies had yet to surrender their allowances. 100% compliance was 
achieved without the government having coerced anyone, simply playing on its normative power. For 
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the power-producers who needed to buy extra allowances at around 40 RMB each, it would have 
been cheaper to accept the maximum fines. However, compliance was deemed more important than 
money. The 2014 and 2015 compliance processes went more smoothly, both achieving 100% 
compliance. 
The ETS pilot was initially scheduled for 2015. After it was announced that the national market would 
start in 2017, the seven pilots added a 2016 cycle. For 2016 Shanghai added more sectors such as 
harbours, increasing the number of compliance-entities from 191 to 315. The total allowances were 
reduced from 160 to 155 million (Chen and Reklev, 2016). In July 2017 DRC announced that all 
companies but one, Alcatel-Lucent Shanghai, complied on time in June 2017; after receiving a letter 
from DRC, Alcatel-Lucent completed the necessary compliance tasks in July (Shanghai DRC, 2017). 
5.3 Economic, political and social conditions 
Politically, China is moving towards greater marketization, as with the national ETS. This made the 
ETS pilot important, for DRC, the supporting agencies in Shanghai, and the top municipal 
government. With NDRC approval and the mayor’s backing, the tone was normatively set. Those 
most negatively affected by the policy were the compliance companies. Otherwise, no major 
opposition was voiced. Rather, actors and organizations not included in the pilot expressed interest, 
such as carbon consultancies. Several banks joined the Exchange as members. Investors were 
allowed to trade in the pilot from 2014; initially there were six investors, which grew to 26 by 2015 
and to 146 by 2016. In 2016 the investors conducted 63% of the trade (SHEEEX, 2017). This interest 
was also confirmed by my interviews, informal meetings and event participation. Challenges were 
acknowledged, but the tone was positive. The revenue possibilities along with the future national 
market made the ETS pilot an attractive opportunity for businesses not enrolled in the pilot. 
6. The 10,000 Programme 
6.1 Policy 
The 10,000 Programme followed the 11th Five-Year Plan’s (2006–2010) 'Top-1,000 Energy-Consuming 
Enterprises Programme’, which had been formulated quickly in 2006 to support the target of 
reducing energy intensity by 20%. It covered the 1,000 highest energy-consuming enterprises, in nine 
sectors. Companies were required to improve energy efficiency, to establish energy-saving 
organizations, and conduct energy audits (Price et al., 2011). The 10,000 Programme continued this 
effort, contributing to the 12th Five-Year Plan’s carbon- and energy-intensity targets. 
The main 10,000-Programme rules were issued by the NDRC in December 2011. The notice was 
signed by 11 ministries, commissions and administrations, including the ministries of finance and 
commerce (NDRC, 2011a). Later in 2012 NDRC provided specific rules, such as how to determine 
annual performances. This was a centrally initiated, top–down policy. The 10,000 Programme had a 
goal of cumulative energy-saving nationally of 250 million tons of standard coal equivalents. Each 
entity covered had to save energy, calculated by intensities; companies were urged to improve on 
energy-management and energy-saving technology (NDRC, 2011a). 
The 10,000 Programme included those industry enterprises with a 2010 energy consumption of 
10,000 tons of standard coal or higher. Enterprises of passenger and freight cargo, coastal and river 
ports would be included if they had an annual energy-consumption above 10,000 tons, or more than 
600 vehicles, or cargo volume higher than 50 million tons. Hotels, restaurants, commercial buildings 
and educational institutions would be included if they in 2010 consumed more than 5,000 tons of 
standard coal, or covered an area greater than 80,000 m2 (hotels), 50,000 m2 (commercial buildings), 
or had more than 10,000 students (schools/ universities). In 2010, almost 17,000 entities came above 
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this threshold nationally, accounting for 60% of China’s energy consumption (NDRC, 2011a). In 
Shanghai, 269 entities were covered: 206 industrial companies, 36 transportation companies, 4 
hotels, 10 commercial companies and 13 universities. The cumulative city-target for energy savings 
within the period was 658,700 tons of standard coal equivalents (NDRC, 2011a). 
As the energy-saving potential was being maximized and further energy-saving would be difficult, it 
was important for the NDRC that companies should pay greater attention to energy management. In 
addition to saving energy, target entities were required to strengthen their energy management by 
forming small leading groups and creating energy-saving systems, using the Chinese standard 
GB/T23331, similar to the international ISO50001 standard. Companies were to self-report their 
progress every March to their local government (NDRC, 2011a). Following a detailed score-sheet, 
energy saved merited as much as 40% of the score; energy-management measures could account for 
up to 60% of the total score.3 A score below 61 meant the entity had not passed the requirements 
that year. Province-level governments had to submit their results by the end of April each year to the 
national government (NDRC, 2011a). 
Stipulated retributions for violations of programme requirements included revoking of sewage- and 
production licences, and ordering suspension of production. Punitive tariffs could be applied if 
energy-intensity from production exceeded the national standard. If energy-saving targets were not 
met, local governments were to conduct mandatory energy-audits. The 10,000 Programme 
encouraged using financial incentives and approaches like directing local, national and international 
funds to support local implementation of energy-saving measures (NDRC, 2011a). 
Several interviewees criticized the 10,000 Programme’s rules for calculating energy-savings: they 
were tailored for industry, and the calculation methods made it difficult for non-industrial sectors like 
hotels to achieve the required targets. Moreover, the methods were based solely on energy 
consumption, without considering changes in production due to market shifts, or the energy-saving 
potential. Some companies had already improved their efficiency, and found it very difficult to 
improve further. 
6.2 Implementation 
The 10,000 Programme stipulated a two-level management-system. NDRC had responsibility for 
coordinating and leading the programme nationally, while it was up to the province-level energy-
saving authorities to implement and coordinate the programme locally (NDRC, 2011a). In Shanghai, 
the DRC has general responsibility for energy-saving efforts, but the Shanghai Economy and 
Informatization Commission (EIC) was the main agency responsible for this policy. It issued notices 
with instructions to the target entities. The EIC was supported by the Shanghai Energy Efficiency 
Centre (SHEEC) and Shanghai Energy Conservation Supervision Centre (ECSC) which performed 
energy-audits, on-site inspection and provided training. The two centres are energy-saving 
knowledge-bases with highly qualified staff – that was the impression of interviewees, confirmed by 
my own contact with the centres. The target entities reported annually to various parts of the 
municipal bureaucracy – all industry to the EIC, transport entities to the Bureau of Transport, etc. 
The implementing agencies told me that training was held in Shanghai. Inviting industry companies 
with energy consumption above 5,000 tons annually, the ECSC held training for some 500–600 
companies in Shanghai. All industrial companies in the 10,000 Programme were covered in the 
training, which brought up topics ranging from energy-auditing and reporting to inspection of old 
highly energy-consuming equipment. To facilitate communication and answer questions, the ECSC 
served as a contact-point, with designated contact-persons for each sector. 
 
3 For a detailed survey of the scoresheet and scores, see Lo (2015). 
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As the self-reporting showed that some entities were below the 61-pass threshold in 2013, the 
Shanghai government allocated funding and conducted mandatory energy-audits, as per the 
programme rules, for more than 20 entities. However, no punitive measures were employed.  
The 10,000 Programme’s target entities were encouraged to utilize Energy Performance Contracting 
and Energy Service Companies (ESCOs). It was also possible to apply for municipal funds for support 
of such work. Some interviewees felt that it was not easy for target entities to navigate among the 
many funding possibilities; others saw no problems here. Between 2011 and 2015, 388 contract 
projects obtained governmental funding, with a cumulative saving of 19.72 million tons of coal, but it 
is not clear how much of this was due to the 10,000 Programme (Shanghai EIC, 2017). 
Some interviewees noted that it was difficult for non-industrial entities to fulfil all the requirements, 
such as forming working-groups, because of insufficient manpower. Some indicated that many target 
entities were not overly concerned about the programme, as the energy-saving measures they 
implemented would probably have been taken regardless of programme participation. This indicates 
that the municipal government’s power-use was quite modest in enforcing the programme. Had the 
policy been communicated differently, the target entities’ responses might have been different. 
However, some companies that failed to achieve the target did contact the government to explain 
their situation. In 2014, the implementing agencies repeated mandatory energy-audits for around 20 
entities which had not achieved pass scores, but again did not apply further punitive measures. On 
the national annual lists over entities that had not met the requirements, all Shanghai listings were 
accompanied with brief explanations, e.g. that market changes had led to a difference from expected 
production. 
6.3 Economic, political and social conditions  
The 10,000 Programme continued the line of energy-saving work intensified in 2006. Energy-saving 
had been a political goal for some time, as shown by the Energy-Conservation Law from 2005. 
Energy-saving contributes to creating the ‘ecological civilization’ and circular economy – ideals 
espoused by the government. Recent years have also seen a noticeable growth in the energy-service 
industry in Shanghai, encouraged by the government. From 2010 to 2015, Shanghai’s energy-service 
industry quadrupled in estimated value to 39.98 billion RMB, encompassing over 400 companies. In 
the same period, 8.5 billion RMB was invested in energy-management contracts (Energy-Saving and 
Environmental Protection Magazine, 2016). While official documents stated the importance of 
implementing the 10,000 Programme in Shanghai, it was my impression that it did not have the same 
perceived importance as the ETS pilot among implementing agencies, target entities or observers. 
For instance, after I had a meeting with a renowned expert who regularly advised the Shanghai 
government on sustainability-issues, he suggested that I should concentrate on the ETS pilot and not 
waste time on this ‘old-fashioned’ policy. There was no major opposition to the programme in 
Shanghai, but neither were there any major proponents. 
7. Comparison and analysis  
The two policies had differences, as in origin, but also similarities, such as encountering problems 
during implementation. Comparison using the policy-implementation process model reveals the 
normative power of the ETS’ local ownership as one key factor. 
Policy 
The nature of the policy-problem can influence policy output. Some issues are easier to handle than 
others (Jänicke, 1997). Different methods for addressing the same problem may affect the output. 
The workings of the ETS pilot were initially harder for companies to understand than the 10,000 
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Programme’s requirements: the ETS was unlike previous ‘control-and command’ policies. Whereas 
many points were involved in completing the 10,000 Programme and achieving a successful output, it 
was really only the surrendering of allowances that counted in the ETS pilot. There, companies had 
the options of selling allowances or banking before submitting each compliance-cycle’s allowances –
several paths to positive output. The 10,000 Programme offered less leeway. Further, the ETS pilot’s 
allocation of allowances was better tailored to the various sectors. The 10,000 Programme was ‘one 
size fits all’ as regards policy obligations, which also probably created difficulties with the energy-
saving and the energy-management requirements. When the energy-saving target is based solely on 
previous energy-consumption, shifting market conditions can make targets hard to reach. It makes 
sense to establish a leading group on energy-saving if the company is a large energy-intensive 
industry, but not necessarily for a hotel with perhaps only one person in charge of energy-use as part 
of a portfolio of maintenance responsibilities. 
Further, the ETS pilot originated locally. Having initiated it, the top municipal government displayed 
ownership to and attached prestige to the ETS pilot to a much larger degree than with the 10,000 
Programme. That the rules were formulated locally also provided the municipal government with 
flexibility, such as hosting an auction – not possible under the top–down 10,000 Programme.  
Policy resources 
The implementing agencies were competent, and the responsible government commissions were 
supported by expert auxiliary agencies, which probably contributed considerably to facilitating 
implementation of both policies. That the ETS pilot was initiated locally was evident in the resources 
invested at each stage: in educating the implementing agencies, then in creating the rules and a 
mayor-headed leading group, hosting events attended by national dignitaries, and holding informal 
talks with companies to ensure trading. These actions also sent normative signals that it was 
important to complete the pilot successfully. With the 10,000 Programme there were more funding 
opportunities for energy-saving projects – but that did not seem to make target entities more 
positive.  
Communication & enforcement activities  
Both policies included offers of assistance with specific contact persons. The ETS pilot offered more 
training sessions, perhaps because it was a new policy instrument for most companies, and more 
instruction was needed. Regarding sanctions, in neither policy were punishments or coercive power 
employed. Prescribed mandatory audits were completed for entities that failed to fulfil their energy-
saving targets in the 10,000 Programme, without further punitive measures. In the ETS pilot, informal 
talks were used to persuade target entities to change behaviour, and a letter in 2017. 
There was a difference in the normatively communicated importance of the two policies. The ETS 
pilot’s mayoral support, national-level officials attendance at events, as well as efforts to persuade 
companies to fulfil their obligations, together constituted the normative power employed by the 
government. 
Economic, political and social conditions 
Both policies were strongly supported by the national political level, as cornerstones in the national 
energy-saving and emissions-reduction undertaking. More money often means more support. During 
the implementation period, the 10,000 Programme can probably be linked to greater economic 
production than the ETS pilot. The reported value of trading permits and offset allowances at the 
exchange for the ETS pilot reached 621 million RMB for the three first compliance years. That is a 
considerable amount, but little in comparison to the 40 billion RMB energy-service sector in Shanghai 
which catered to the 10,000 Programme – if not direct causal links between the programme and the 
sector. Nevertheless, it was the ETS pilot that attracted more attention from non-targeted actors like 
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investors and consultancies, despite the possibilities of revenue generation and economic activity 
was for the future and not immediate. The potential advantage for ETS-related businesses was 
backed by the central government’s emphasis on the coming national market. One reason the central 
government started with the market mechanism was precisely the belief that there were limits to 
what top–down policies like the 10,000 Programme could achieve (Stensdal et al., 2018). 
Target entity responses and strategies 
Few target entities enthusiastically supported either policy. Although most target entities followed 
the requirements, some were negative. The ten initially unwilling companies had argued that the ETS 
pilot’s costs would hinder profits. Perhaps more disagreement was voiced concerning the ETS pilot 
because it was a new and unfamiliar policy. The complaints were not voiced in the second 
compliance cycle: by then, the normative power had influenced the companies into acceptance. That 
the companies which didn’t pass the 10,000 Programme’s requirements themselves contacted the 
authorities to explain indicates that completion failure was not a disgruntlement strategy. 
8. Concluding remarks 
Considering how the government worked to enforce these emissions mitigation policies, one may 
wonder how much was achieved. High output without any effect on the policy issue has little value. 
To what extent the two policies contributed to reducing emissions is unclear, however. Shanghai 
reduced its carbon and energy intensities by 29% and 25% in the 12th Plan period, well ahead of the 
targeted 19% and 18% (Shanghai government, 2017), but comprehensive data are not publicly 
available. In 2014, the Shanghai government announced that in the first year of the ETS, 2013, the 
compliance-companies had together reduced their carbon emissions by 4.3 million tons, or 2.7 % 
compared to emissions in 2011 (SHEEEX, 2015). In 2017, the Exchange announced that compliance-
companies’ combined emissions fell from around 150 million tons CO2 in 2014 to around 141 million 
CO2 in 2015 (Chen & Reklev, 2017). How much of this reduction came directly from participation in 
the pilot was not mentioned in either statements. With the 10,000 Programme, the Shanghai 
government announced in 2017 that the combined energy-savings were 133% of the expected 
amount (Shanghai EIC, 2017, appendix 1), or 874,095 tons of coal. Thus, although the 10,000 
Programme did not achieve 100% fulfilment in terms of participation output, the collective energy-
saving goal was surpassed. However, it is difficult to ascertain the energy-savings share of the 10,000 
Programme separate from other energy-saving measures. Indeed, studies have found that Shanghai’s 
energy intensity improvements carbon mitigation since 2000 to a large extent have been outweighed 
by the fast-growing energy consumption. The main reason behind curbed emissions since 2007 is the 
restructuring of Shanghai’s economy from primary industry to the service sector (Yang et al., 2108). 
Nevertheless, governments are unlikely to cease implementing low carbon policies in favour of solely 
focusing on economic restructuring. Thus, it is still worth studying such policies, if with an uncertain 
amount effect on mitigating carbon emissions. 
What lessons may be valuable for future implemented policies? The two policies show that no single 
factor can fully explain output: it results from a combination of factors. Achieving greater output is 
easier when the policy can be adapted to differing circumstances and sectors rather than issuing ‘one 
size’ factors. The sector facilitations were also perceived as a more reasonable approach among the 
interviewees. Given that the two policies and others are partially overlapping, bundling and better 
coordinating related policies in the future may further streamline and facilitate companies’ 
compliance burden. Moreover, that a policy needs accompanying resources, in financing and 
implementing-agency capacity to be implemented, is essential. Less immediately observable is that 
how a policy is communicated to stakeholders is important for how they respond. The ETS pilot was 
especially important to the Shanghai government, which employed normative power. The 
‘ownership’ signalled normatively that the ETS pilot was a priority. It is not a guarantee against 
13 
 
opposition, but may very well be the extra push companies need to comply. Equivalent national 
signals are building ‘beautiful China’s ecological civilization’. Linking chosen national prioritized 
policies to this principle may instil a similar perception of importance as with the ETS pilot in 
Shanghai. Such emphasis can only pertain to one or few chosen policies, though. If too many policies 
are stressed it dilutes their relative importance.  
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